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established pursuant to the Financial 
Services Act 1986 and the Banking Act 1987 
is not fundamentally flawed. Most 
problems flow from the regulations and 
the interpretations put on them. If the 
Chancellor wishes to make financial 
regulation work it would be better advised 
to focus on this, and tinker as necessary 
with the regulatory structure. Instead 
they are committed to a vainglorious 
restructuring of the regulatory bodies,
which at best risks matters getting worse 
before any improvement takes place due 
to near inevitable teething problems. This 
is not a message to which the Chancellor 
seems receptive.
'Take care, your worship,' said Sancho; 'those 
things....are not giants but windmills, and what 
seem to be their arms are the sails, which are 
whirled round in the wind and make the 
millstones turn.'
'It is quite clear,' replied Don Quixote, 'thatyou 
are not experienced in this matter of adventures. 
They are giants, and if you are afraid, go away 
and say your prayers, whilst I advance and 
engage them in fierce and unequal battle.' w
Andrew Haynes
Head of Institute of Finance Law, University of 
Wolverhampton.
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The role of the judiciary in public life 
has expanded significantly in recent 
years. This change has come about partly 
as a result of the growth in size of the 
judicial system and partly because of the 
increased activism of the judiciary 
through the development of judicial
REFORMS ELSEWHERE
In Canada and South Africa significant 
changes in appointments processes have 
been introduced in recent years (see M Fitz- 
James, 'Free expression and the Judges', New 
Law Journal, 30 April 1993 and S Kentridge, 
'Parliamentary Supremacy and the Judiciary 
under a Bill of Rights: Some Lessons from 
the Commonwealth' Public Law, Spring 
1997).
In New Zealand and Australia the systems 
remain largely unchanged but there have 
been growing calls for structural reforms. 
See the speech of the New Zealand Attorney 
General, P East, to the New Zealand Bar 
Association, March 1995, p. 2.
review. One consequence of this 
development has been to raise the level of 
interest in the judicial appointment 
process. As the size and political 
influence of the judiciary has increased, 
so have the demands for changes in the 
way judges are appointed. This link 
between the expansion of the judicial 
role and moves to reform the 
appointment process is not unique to 
England; it has also arisen in Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
The Human Rights Bill incorporating 
the European Convention on Human 
Rights into English law, which is 
currently going through Parliament, will 
take this process one stage further and, as 
Lord Irvine has acknowledged, will 
significantly increase the power of the 
judges (interviewed in New Statesman, 6 
December 1996). The pressure for 
reform is therefore very likely to grow 
after incorporation.
Before reviewing the possible effects 
which changes to the appointment 
process might have on the judiciary, it is 
worth examining more carefully the 
nature of the present system and the 
concerns which it has generated, in order 
to assess exactly what any reforms are 
intended to achieve. There are two 
aspects to the criticisms of the present 
system:
  the procedural failings of the system in 
terms of accountability, judicial 
independence and openness; and




The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham, 
argued in 1996 that the key to a 
successful appointment process lies in:
'... an assumption shared by appointer, 
appointee and the public at large that those 
appointed should be capable of discharging 
their judicial duties, so far as humanly possible, 
with impartiality.' (Judicial Independence, 
speech to the Judicial Studies Board, 5 
November 1996, p. 5)
According to Lord Bingham, the
o o
principle of impartiality, though not 
synonymous with independence, is its 
'close blood tie' and therefore lies at the 
heart of a good appointment process. 
Thus judicial independence and, 
crucially, public and judicial confidence 
in its existence, is a central concern. The 
principle of judicial independence 
demands that judges should be free from 
outside interference in their decision- 
making, in particular, from those in 
government. To avoid this danger it is
O O
often said that the judges should not owe 
their office to the executive. On the face 
of it, therefore, the current arrangements 
whereby the Lord Chancellor and, in the 
case of the senior judges, the Prime 
Minister, have control of the 
appointment process, risks contravening 
the principle of judicial independence.
The Home Affairs Select Committee 
which reviewed the appointment process 
in 1996 considered this problem in some 
detail. The concern of those witnesses 
heard by the Committee, who criticised 13
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this aspect of the system, was one of 
theory rather than practice. There was no 
suggestion that any Lord Chancellor in 
recent years had exercised his powers 
improperly and there was general praise, 
in particular, for the quality of 
appointments made by Lord Mackay 
when Lord Chancellor. Similarly, the 
Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham, has 
recently argued that there is virtually no 
evidence of appointments since 1945 
made otherwise than on the basis of 
merit (Judicial Independence, p. 5). 
Nevertheless, it has been widely argued 
that the potential for the erosion of 
judicial independence exists under the 
current system, and that the growing 
power of the judiciary is increasing this 
risk:
'If courts are going to wade or be pulled 
into politically controversial areas, pressure 
will undoubtedly build to secure judges with 
'acceptable' views, the definition of 
'acceptable' varying widely, naturally, among 
MPs and various interest groups.' 
(J Waltman, 'Judicial Activism in 
England' in Judicial Activism in Comparative 
Perspective, ed. K Holland (1991), p. 46)
Thus one reason for reforming the 
appointments process is to ensure that as 
the role of the judiciary expands, the 
tradition of judicial independence is not 
undermined.
At the same time as reinforcing judicial 
independence, any change must 
strengthen the degree of accountability in 
the appointments process. Although, 
theoretically, Parliament is entitled to 
scrutinise the appointments made by the 
Lord Chancellor, in practice, as Lord 
Mackay confirmed to the Home Affairs 
Select Committee, it does not do so for 
fear of impinging on judicial 
independence. Concern over the absence 
of such scrutiny is linked to criticism of 
the lack of openness in the process, both 
in relation to the extent of information 
provided to applicants for judicial posts 
and to the general public.
In response to these concerns, Lord 
Mackay instituted a number of reforms 
to the appointments system during his 
time as Lord Chancellor. Since 1986 
advertisements, job descriptions and 
appointment criteria have gradually been 
introduced for all but the most senior 
judicial posts. The appointment of 
Assistant Recorders, Recorders and 
Circuit Judges now involves a formal 
interview before a panel made up of a
judge, a member of the Lord 
Chancellor's department and a lay 
person. These reforms have been built on 
by Lord Irvine. The number of lay- 
interviewers has been increased to 50 
and the role of the panels has been 
extended to allow them to participate in 
assessing the applications before 
interview.
These changes have received 
widespread support. Nevertheless, strong 
criticism remains about the system of 
consultations, whereby the views of 
senior members of the bench and bar are 
sought on the suitability of a candidate
O j
(see, for example, JUSTICE (1992), The 
Judiciary in England and Wales, p. 12). This 
process has been described as recalling 
the days of the 'rotten boroughs' (C 
Harlow, 'Refurbishing the Judicial 
Service', in Public Law and Politics, ed. C 
Harlow (1996), p. 191), the main 
concerns being that it is unstructured, 
disproportionately favours advocates, and 
relies on hearsay and impressionistic 
opinions, with the result that it 
encourages a self-perpetuating culture 
which hinders capable people from non- 
traditional backgrounds from reaching 
the bench.
TYPE OF JUDGE 
APPOINTED
There are two aspects to the question 
of what type of judges are appointed   
their competence and their 
representativeness. The former has 
attracted less attention, as there is a 
widespread consensus that the standards 
of competence are generally high, 
particularly among senior judges. The 
Home Affairs Select Committee heard 
evidence from Lord Mackay, then Lord 
Chancellor, that he believed that the 
judges were of a high calibre and that he 
received 'very very little in the way of 
complaint about the appointment of 
particular judges' (Home Affairs Select 
Committee, Judicial Appointments 
Procedures, Session 1995 96, vol.1, p. vi, 
para. 5). The organisation JUSTICE 
similarly expressed general satisfaction 
with the competence of the bench in 
evidence to the Home Affairs Select 
Committee.
In contrast to these expressions of 
satisfaction, the background of the judges 
continues to be the subject of extensive 
criticism. The fact that the bench is still 
dominated by white male barristers aged 
over 50 years, who have been privately
educated and are graduates of Oxford or 
Cambridge, has repeatedly attracted 
attention. Although solicitors are now 
eligible for appointment to all levels of 
the judiciary it remains strongly advocacy 
based. Barristers with 'paper' practices as 
well as solicitors are currently 
significantly under-represented on the 
bench. Moreover there is still weighting 
in favour of those barristers with criminal 
experience and with generalist practices. 
In 1991 a leading solicitor, Geoffrey 
Bindman, went so far as to suggest that 
the current under-representation of 
women and black people being appointed 
judges might amount to a breach of the 
Race Relations Act and Sex 
Discrimination Act, which both prohibit 
unintended indirect discrimination.
USE OF AN APPOINTMENTS 
COMMISSION
Against this background, any changes 
must seek to ensure that the competence 
of the judiciary is maintained at the same 
time as the judges' backgrounds are 
widened and the appointment process is 
made more open and accountable, while 
also upholding judicial independence.
Since there is very little support for the 
introduction of popular elections for 
choosing judges, as in sonic US states, or 
a specially trained judiciary, as in many 
continental European countries, or 
appointment by the legislature, the only 
structural reform which is likely is the 
adoption of some form of commission. 
The proposal for the establishment of a 
judicial appointments commission was 
set out as Labour Party policy in 1995 
and now has widespread support outside 
the judiciary (The Labour Party, Access to 
Justice (1995) p. 13. See also The Judiciary 
in England and Wales, p. 5). The Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Irvine, recently 
reviewed the possibility of establishing a 
commission. In October 1997, he 
announced that the pressure of other 
work on the department made such a 
change impracticable at the present time, 
although he stated that he had not ruled 
it out for the future. Although there is a 
growing interest in the establishment of a 
commission, this form of appointment 
system is something of an unknown 
quantity in England and Wales, and there 
is very little knowledge about what effects 
a commission might have. It is therefore
o
useful to consider the experience of other 
countries where such a system is used. A 
useful source of information comes from
North America where commissions are a 
common method of appointment.
Use of commissions in the US and 
Canada
Commissions do not generally 
constitute a free-standing appointments 
system. It is rare lor a commission to 
make the final appointment of the judges 
itsell; more commonly, it recommends a 
list of appointees to the executive which 
then makes the appointment. (An 
example of a commission which appoints 
directly is Israel where judges are 
appointed by a committee of nine   
made up of three judges, two lawyers, 
two members of parliament and two 
ministers.) Some commissions play a 
more limited advisory role. Their 
function is to vet those candidates whom 
the executive provides rather than to 
recruit or select candidates themselves 
(the Canadian and US committees and 
commissions at the federal level are 
advisory). In general, the more proactive
US AND CANADA
In both the US and Canada the degree of 
political involvement in the judicial 
appointments process is considered to be 
lower at state than federal level and 
commissions are widely felt to be responsible 
for this difference. However, in some US 
states, particularly those in which judges 
were directly elected in the past, criticisms 
have been expressed that the open politics of 
the ballot have simply been replaced by the 
closed manipulations of commission 
members.
type of commission is more common at 
state and provincial level but across the 
US and Canada there is a wide range of 
different models with different 
membership, powers and functions.
In the US since 1940, 33 states and the 
district of Columbia have created some 
form of commission and many of the 
remaining states seem likely to follow this 
pattern. In Canada, appointment 
commissions (more usually called 
committees) have only been widely used 
since the 1980s, which means that there 
is less data on their effects. However, the 
experience of Canada is a useful one, 
because its appointment system before 
the introduction of committees was very 
similar to that of England and Wales. 
Unlike the US, it has no history of 
appointment by election and has adopted 
committees in an attempt to provide
greater openness and wider participation, 
within the context of an existing 
executive appointment system.
One of the most informative Canadian 
committees is the Ontario Judicial 
Appointments Advisory Committee 
(JAAC). The Ontario system is now 
established as the one which Canadian 
commentators cite as the most successful 
example of the use of a committee in 
Canada, and is increasingly a model for 
other provinces. Despite being called an 
advisory committee it is a full 
commission, as it is the Committee 
which advertises vacancies, conducts 
interviews and sends a shortlist of 
candidates to the Attorney General for 
appointment.
EFFECTS OF THE 
COMMISSIONS
Gauging the likely effects of a 
commission on the basis of evidence of 
the US and Canadian experience is not 
an easy task since, as one US 
commentator put it:
'... the debate over judicial appointment is 
sojilled with value judgements and 
unsupported claims that it is hard to identify 
what is known Jrom what is not.' (A 
Champagne and J Haydel, Judicial Reform 
in the US (1993), p. 14, University Press 
of America, New York)
Nevertheless, some general 
conclusions can be reached.
Appointments process under a 
commission
Most North American commissions 
produce annual reports and actively seek 
to inform the public about their work 
and to respond openly to public 
enquiries. However, commissions do not 
generally operate on the basis of total 
openness. In the US, most commissions 
have confidentiality provisions, covering 
communications between the 
commissioners and third parties such as 
referees and other members of the bar 
and bench. In Ontario, the JAAC carries 
out so-called 'discrete inquiries' of senior 
members of the bench and bar, 
equivalent to the consultation process in 
England and Wales. Although the JAAC 
has expressed its concern about the lack 
of openness of this aspect of the process, 
it has concluded that the system needs to 
be retained, because much valuable 
information is obtained through this 
channel (Judicial Appointments Advisory 
Committee, Final Report and 
Recommendations (1992), p. IS, Ontario).
In this respect, therefore, the 
commission system does not provide an 
absolute solution to the secrecy 
surrounding the consultation process.
A stronger claim, which can be made 
by supporters of commissions, is that 
they encourage judicial independence by 
removing the executive from the 
recruitment and assessment process. In 
both the US and Canada the degree of 
political involvement in the judicial 
appointments process is considered to be 
lower at state than federal level and 
commissions are widely felt to be 
responsible for this difference. However, 
in some US states, particularly those in 
which the judges were directly elected in 
the past, criticisms have been expressed 
that the open politics of the ballot have 
simply been replaced by the closed 
manipulations of commission members. 
It has also been claimed that some 
Governors have used their powers of 
appointing commission members to 
ensure that it contains a majority of their 
political supporters. Such criticisms are 
less often heard in states where the level 
of political activity in the appointment 
process was low before the introduction 
of the commissions, and in Canada there 
is a far wider consensus that the 
committees, particularly at province 
level, have strengthened judicial 
independence.
Accountability
Similar problems arise in assessing the 
effect of commissions in terms of 
accountability. Criticisms have been 
expressed in both the US and Canada 
about the reduction of constitutional 
accountability' which the move to a 
commission involves. Where once judges 
were directly elected or chosen by an 
elected and accountable politician, the 
creation of a commission is said to 
remove the appointments process one 
step further from the electorate, since lay 
members of commissions are usually 
appointed by the executive and lawyer 
members by their legal professional 
bodies. Similar concerns have been 
expressed in England and Wales. Eord 
Mackay argued against changing the 
appointments system before the Home 
Affairs Select Committee on the grounds 
that the present arrangements secured 
accountability' because the Lord 
Chancellor was personally answerable to 
Parliament lor the appointments made. 
However, since this accountability is as 
we have seen, more theoretical than real, 15
this disadvantage may be minimal in
o J
practice. Moreover, since the final 
appointment remains in the hands of the 
executive, it can be said that the chain of 
accountability is not, in fact, broken by 
the creation of a commission.
Type of judges appointed
Supporters of commissions argue 
strongly that they produce a more 
competent judge whereas their critics 
argue that they reduce the calibre of the 
bench. In the US the empirical evidence 
suggests that neither claim is well- 
founded. The conclusion reached by 
many observers is that the type of 
appointment process used makes very 
little difference to the quality of the 
judges appointed:
'There is no evidence to support the 
proposition that any one of these systems 
produces a "better judge" than do the others. 
Academic background and prior judicial 
experience tend to be approximately the same 
for judges selected under each system.' (M 
Volcansek and J Lafon, Judicial 
Appointment: The Cross-Evaluation of French 
and American Practices (1988), p. 139, 
Greenwood Press, New York)
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
In one important respect, the use of a 
commission can be said to be a clear 
improvement on other methods of 
appointment. Public confidence in the use 
of commissions in the US and Canada is 
generally very high. This is evidenced by 
the fact that every state or province that has 
changed its appointment system has moved 
to a commission and none that has adopted 
a commission has abandoned it. Where 
commissions are used the appointments 
process appears to attract less criticism 
than either an elected system or exclusive 
appointment by the executive.
There is similarly no clear consensus 
among commentators in the US as to the 
effect of the commissions in terms of the 
representativeness of the bench. Some 
suggest that the selection method has no 
effect (P Webster, 'Selection and 
Retention of Judges: Is there one 'best' 
method?', Florida State University Law 
Review (1995); some conclude that 
women and minority groups do better 
under a system of exclusive executive
appointment, and some suggest that 
commissions provide a better 
representative balance (American 
Judicature Society, Merit Selection: The Best 
Way to Choose The Best Judges (1995) 
Chicago).
In Ontario, however, there is stronger77 o
evidence to support the claim that the use 
of a commission can affect the make-up 
of the bench. At the time the JAAC was 
established in 1989, women made up a 
very small minority of the bench, 
equivalent to the current position in 
England and Wales. Between 1989 and
o
1995, the proportion of women judges 
appointed rose to 40%. During the same 
period there was some, though less, of an 
increase in the numbers of judges from 
ethnic minorities (Judicial Appointments 
Advisory Committee, Annual Report 
1994-95, 1995, Ontario). An important 
factor in the success in increasing the 
numbers of women judges in Ontario was 
the approach of the commissioners and 
the Attorney General at the time, which 
resulted in a concerted effort to recruit 
women to the bench. In 1990, for 
example, the committee undertook an 
'outreach' programme whereby it 
contacted associations representing 
women lawyers asking them to encourage 
outstanding lawyers within their 
association to consider applying to the 
bench. At the same time the Attorney 
General also wrote to 1.200 eligible
' o
women lawyers similarly asking them to 
consider applying. These positive efforts 
greatly increased the numbers of eligible 
women candidates.
These findings suggest that 
commissions per se do not inherently 
improve the quality of the appointment 
process, or the type of judge appointed, 
but that their creation can provide the 
necessary change in institutional culture 
to bring about a greater degree of 
openness and the active recruitment of 
under-represented groups.
Finally, in one important respect, the 
use of a commission can be said to be a 
clear improvement on other methods of 
appointment. Public confidence in the 
use of commissions in the US and 
Canada is generally very high. This is 
evidenced by the fact that every state or 
province that has changed its 
appointment system has moved to a 
commission and none that has adopted a 
commission has abandoned it. Where 
commissions are used the appointments
process appears to attract less criticism 
than either an elected system or exclusive 
appointment by the executive.
SUMMARY
The task of reforming the 
appointments system is a daunting one. 
Any changes must reconcile a number of 
different and potential conflicting 
requirements. In the past the judiciary 
was required to be professionally highly 
competent and strongly independent. 
Today, in addition to these attributes, it 
must be more representative and more 
accountable. These are demanding aims, 
but also ones which, if achieved, will 
produce a judiciary which can command 
public confidence. Such confidence is 
arguably a prerequisite for a body which 
affects the lives of more individuals than 
ever and will increasingly decide public 
policy matters of the greatest social 
importance.
As the judiciary grows in size and 
influence, the pressure for the 
introduction of a judicial appointments 
commission is likely to grow. The use of a 
commission is not a panacea nor will it 
transform the judiciary overnight. This 
will reassure the judges and dismay those 
with more radical visions. In its favour, a 
commission may provide a means to 
draw a broader range of candidates into 
the appointment process and has the 
potential to operate more open 
procedures. The fact that commissions 
appear to command general public 
support is also an increasingly important 
variable. As the judiciary is drawn into 
more controversial political areas, it will 
inevitably face greater public criticism, 
and the introduction of a reform that will 
strengthen public support should not be 
dismissed lightly by the judges. @
Dr Kate Malleson
Department of Law, London School of 
Economics.
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